Foreign policy, is an extension of domestic and in turn, domestic policy informs economic policy.
In other words foreign policy should be subject to national economic interests, it should serve them, promote our goods and services in international markets, protect our own markets and domestic enterprises and assist in attracting investment. The current Ukrainian political establishment pursues policies that run counter to these fundamental tenets.

By the end of Viktor.Yushchenko's presidential term the international position of Ukraine turned out to be at its weakest since independence. Kiev has lost its foreign policy initiatives in all aspects and is forced to cede to other international players, even in those fields in which had been traditionally very strong for Ukraine. The dangers of continuing in this manner are that Ukraine runs the risk of losing its place on the international stage and its sovereignty, which in turn will have a negative impact on domestic and economic processes and the diplomatic service collapses.

Ukrainian foreign policy strategy for the last five years has been limited to making the state a sanitary ‘buffer zone' around Russia. This foreign policy course has affected Ukraine economically, it has impaired its position in the post-Soviet region, made Moscow a powerful international opponent of Ukrainian interests and forced it into unjustified actions. Now that Barack.Obama has been elected as President of the US this course of action has become a total anachronism. Yushchenko's team continues with a policy that is not interesting to Washington anymore. The current President's, and some nationalists diplomats', personal ideological drivers and agendas are being converted into actions that are harmful to state foreign policy.

Kiev's one-dimensional policy isn't even pro-American, only anti-Russian. During L.Kuchma's Presidency there were two forward-looking concepts that were alluded to - "Ukraine as a regional leader" and "Ukraine as an alternative center of power within the CIS", though the implementation of these policies wasn't very successful. Today, however, these projects have degenerated into poor attempts to support of anyone else who is not in Moscow's favour and this has pushed away both Moldavia and Azerbaijan from Ukraine.

Unrealistic from its starting point, the plan of rapid integration to the EU has degenerated into mutual fatigue between Europe and Ukraine. In general, there is no long-term strategy for relations with the EU as a partner and neighbor, despite the existence of a pragmatic vision inside the diplomatic service. This has been highlighted by the attempts to concentrate on signing the Treaty of Association and creating the free trade zone.

The concept of ‘economization of diplomacy' was practically dropped out of Ukraine's foreign policy strategy. This concept aims to focus foreign policy on supporting Ukrainian companies in their efforts to enter the markets of developing countries. Sadly, backing national capital abroad is not an essential part of ruling elite's foreign policy views any more.

Conceptual disadvantages have led to numerous tactical failures. The consequences of the deterioration of political relations with Russia have been the breakdown or derailment of important bilateral projects, such as the creation of the An-70 airplane. Military and technical cooperation has been reduced and Russian cargos are being redirected away from Ukrainian ports. Moscow torpedoes political and economic interests in third-world countries.

Ukraine didn't succeed in striving for the EU's considerable concessions in visa issues and mostly ‘looks through its fingers' at cases of violation of Ukrainian tourist and labour migrant rights in EU countries. Kiev's readiness to bow to EU demands to cancel export limiting duties for the export of scrap metal and sunflower sabadilla are beginning to show. This will inevitably lead to huge losses by Ukrainian metallurgic and oil enterprises.

Kiev has totally lost the initiative in the dialogue with the United States. Ukraine has been making concessions to Washington's requests in recent years, even against its own economic interests. The latest example being the delayed agreement with Russian TVEL on nuclear fuel supply for Ukrainian nuclear power plants; which is a key condition for realization of the project to locate the means of nuclear fuel production in Ukraine. Questions like visa regime simplification, facilitation of access to the American market for Ukrainian enterprises, fulfillment of the US liabilities to eliminate missile fuel, and indemnity for Chernobyl nuclear plant closure remain over and above the heads of Ukrainian leadership.

Under the pressure of Yushchenko's, Tarasiuk's and Ohryzko's Euro-Atlantic aims Ukrainian diplomacy has lost vital ground in relations with Romania, which is the most active regional rival of Ukraine. Besides disadvantageous decisions on the sea-shelf, there is also a slowdown of the shipping project "the Danube - the Black Sea", no reaction to Bucharest's encouragement of antistate sentiments within the Romanian diaspora in Ukraine (including distribution of Romanian passports), and they are ignoring the problem of the rapid assimilation of Ukrainians in Romania. Using its member status of the EU and NATO, Romania has the intention of actively discrediting Ukraine inside the EU and forcing it into economic and political compromise over autonomy for the Romanians of Chernivtsi region. This example from Bucharest could potentially be followed by Bulgaria, Slovakia and Hungary.

Relations with the new leaders of the world economy and policy - China, India, Brazil - are, at best stalled and in some cases, completely paralyzed. Within five years there has been no Presidential, or Prime-Ministerial Minister for Foreign Affairs visit to these countries. Meanwhile, China has become the third largest trade partner of Ukraine since the beginning of the decade. Ukraine stopped promoting its global interests out of the triangle CIS - USA - EU at all.

The diplomatic service also went deep into crisis. As a result of the constitutional reform, and clashes between President and Prime Minister. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs hovered inside the vacuum of management between the Cabinet of Ministers and the Presidential Secretariat and lost practically any potential to coordinate the foreign policy efficiently. As a result, not only conceptually but also institutionally, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the staff of Vice-Premier Minister on European Integration act independently and often against one another.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs' indeterminate placement within the structure of executive power has had disastrous consequences for its maintenance costs. This year the budget was increased just slightly in comparison with 2008 (959 million of hryvnias - 876 millions), despite of high inflation land the effective devaluation of our national currency Our diplomatic service abroad has been forced to economize, even on paper and stationery. Diplomatic staff have no medical insurance any more. Even this budget is barely achievable because of the State Treasury's delay in receiving money; Ukraine is also compelled to turn down sending delegations to many international events. Even deputies of ministers very often have no money for missions to the border regions of the state.

The voluntary nature of leaders of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, B.Tarasiuk and V.Ohryzko, have caused many professionals to retire, especially those of middle-age. Their places are being taken by politicians and bureaucrats, many without the necessary or preferred level of education, who have to profess to Russophobian views. Specific foreign policy priorities resulted in the reshaping of the inner structure of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Today, the department that deals with Central Asian and Pacific region relations consists of only four members and the NATO department has just two dozen of employees.

The double subordination of trade-economic missions to the Ministry of Economy and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs means that most trade-economic missions are very inefficient. The latter have turned into settling for ministerial bureaucrats of medium level, who are seeking an easy life and have no regard for national capital or Ukrainian companies abroad. Ukraine has virtually no system to support its national enterprises abroad or engagement with potential capital investors inside the country.

It is obvious that the current approach to foreign policy must be changed. Ukraine is in need of pragmatic diplomacy that better serves the national economic interests.
A full package of concrete measures can be derived from this:
On a strategic level:
- As a state with a low level of external threats, dependent on export economy and objective dependence on several power centers in Eurasia, Ukraine should turn back to a multifaceted and balanced policy, with an emphasis on economic diplomacy;
- NATO relations should be limited to partnership, and dialogue with the EU shall be developed through the Association Treaty and the free trade zone. At the same time the interests of local Ukrainian companies and residents must be defended much more robustly;
- Kiev should get involved in the favoured Russian-American 'relaunch' of relations by bringing about the concept of the 'political offshore' and also by intervening in the Russian-European dialogue. Special attention should be paid to constructing a partnership with the pentagon of Russia, Ukraine, Germany, France and Italy that may lead to the creation of a peaceful counterweight to the American influence within Europe and its allies in Eastern Europe
- Normalisation of Russian relations may come about through the 'common industrial breakthrough' project that aims at delivering the most favourable conditions to the high-tech industrial cooperatives and putting hard political and humanitarian problems in the background.

On a tactical level:
- To reduce the tension in Ukrainian-Russian relations by focusing on economic cooperation, rejection of reckless support for Saakashvili's regime of Georgia, and removal of the campaign for common history revaluation. Meanwhile, we shall stand up for Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity, prevent the actions of Russian agents within the Crimea and Sevastopol and insist on preserving the cultural and language rights of three million diaspora in the Russian Federation. We can't let ourselves go beyond the scope of tough confrontation and enter the field of unreasonable compromise. We must remember that the Russian Federation always strives for domination in Ukraine and only partly recognizes Ukraine's sovereignty. This will not change even after the 'relaunch' of relations;
- To renew active contact with China, India, Turkey, Egypt, Brazil and other future post-crisis world economic leaders. To arrange visits of the President and the Minister for Foreign Affairs to these states and to hold high level visits to African, Latin-American and Middle-Eastern states. To relaunch relations with Azerbaijan, Armenia and Central-Asian states who suffer from rejecting democratization rhetoric and who are counting on soft competition with Russian projects in their respective regions;
- To activate Ukrainian participation in Transnistrian settlement. To restore the support of the transnistrian elite toward Ukraine. To refuse blind imitation of the EU directives concerning this issue;
- To recommence tough resistance to unfriendly Romanian actions on a bilateral level and in European areas. To reinforce coordination with Hungary and Bulgaria in issues of protection of national minorities' rights by Bucharest;
- To strengthen the control on the entry of EU citizens to Ukraine. To introduce black lists of people under suspicion of pedophilia, criminal activity and unmonitored running of businesses. We have to use these approaches as mechanisms for putting pressure upon the EU member states about the problem of visa regime facilitation for Ukraine.

It is essential that the diplomatic service be reformed. In order to avoid the duplication and the ‘mishmash' of administrating the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, we need to remove the position of the Vice-President for European Integration and to diminish the foreign affairs personnel of the Prime Minister to the group of advisors and the protocol service. Trade-economy missions shall be subordinated to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs only. The main thing is to let these missions receive benefits from the agreements that were settled with their assistance. This will sharply raise their motivation for increasing external economic activity.

Obviously, it is possible to reduce the number of embassies and consulates of Ukraine abroad. At the present moment we have 82 embassies and 32 consulates. However, having six embassies in the Middle East is not justified either by the scale of relations with the respective states, or by the financial and staff capabilities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Many of these embassies could reduce the level of leadership to the adviser-envoy, and the establishment to three specialists. By reducing the number of unnecessary and ineffective institutions we could reinforce the new direction of our diplomatic work - China, India, Brazil, Turkey and so on - without extra expense.

By accomplishing all these measures Ukraine will achieve serious positive changes very soon, potentially within a year. Walking out of the confrontation zone with the Russian Federation, Ukraine will no longer be a barrier to the plan of rebuilding relations in Europe and will receive much wider diplomatic manoeuvring space. A step back from the political focus on rapprochement with the EU will create opportunities for more active dialogue with Brussels on economic, migration and visa issues that correspond with Ukrainian interests. The launch of relations with new economic leaders will provide us with support for national exporters under crisis conditions and allow us to receive investment and credit lines that are not politically connected. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs will coordinate the international activity of state bodies more effectively, will manage to settle its financial complications and will clear the diplomatic service of the 'professional patriots'.

Foreign policy will return to its intended function - to serve the national interests of Ukraine.